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Casenote
Tennessee v. Garner: Fourth Amendment
Limitations on a Peace Officer's Use of
Deadly Force to Effect an Arrest
INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment' imposes limitations on the government's power to seize people. The amendment requires that all
such seizures of persons be reasonable. 2 While the amendment
leaves the terms "seizure" and "reasonable" undefined, the United
States Supreme Court has held that a person has been seized if his
ability to walk away has been restrained.3 A seizure of the person
is reasonable if the state can provide sufficient cause for the seizure
to outweigh the interests of the seized person. 4
At the time of the fourth amendment's adoption, the common
law allowed a peace officer to kill a suspected felon and be free
from criminal and tort liability if killing the felon proved necessary
1. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment is the constitutional embodiment of Lord Camden's decision in
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765), which prohibited
the general warrants and writs of assistance used by the Crown to suppress objectionable
publications. A complete discussion of the fourth amendment is beyond the scope of this
note. For a more complete discussion of the history and scope of the amendment, see
generally J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1982); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1937); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974). See also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3452 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(listing cases discussing the motivation for the fourth amendment). For a discussion of
the fourth amendment as it relates to seizures of persons, see infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
3. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). See infra note 15 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
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to effect an arrest.5 This common-law rule remains in effect in almost half the states today.6 Other states, more restrictive in their
justification of homicide by peace officers, usually justify the use of
deadly force only in the arrest of dangerous felons. 7 Additionally,
police departments today are often more restrictive than state law
requires them to be in authorizing their officers to use deadly force
to effect arrests.8
In Tennessee v. Garner,9 the United States Supreme Court recently held that a peace officer's ability to use deadly force to effect
an arrest is limited by the fourth amendment.' ° In Garner, a divided Court held that the shooting of an unarmed burglar by a
peace officer violated the fourth amendment because the officer
could not have reasonably believed that the burglar posed a threat
to the officer or others. 1I Garner thus imposes constitutional restrictions upon a peace officer's use of deadly force in the arrest
process.
This note will begin with a discussion of fourth amendment jurisprudence and a review of the history and scope of the police
practice of using deadly force to effect arrests. It will then discuss
the Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner. An analysis of the
majority and dissenting opinions will conclude that the majority
adopted an unobjectionable rule but applied it incorrectly, achieving a result more restrictive than that required by the fourth
amendment. Finally, this note will discuss Garner's foreseeable
impact on police department policies, state law, and a peace officer's ability to use any amount of force in effecting an arrest.
5. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the
common-law treatment of the use of deadly force by a peace officer to effect an arrest, see
Day, Shooting the FleeingFelon: State of the Law, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 285, 286-92 (1978);
Pearson, The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MICH. L. REV. 957 (1930); Perkins, The
Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 268-80 (1940); Sherman, Execution Without Trial:
Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71, 74-79 (1980); Comment,
Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering ConstitutionalReview, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
361, 364-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Triggering ConstitutionalReview]; Note, Officer's
Right to Use Deadly Force to Arrest FleeingArrestee, 24 IOWA L. REV. 154, 154-57, 15960 (1938); Comment, Use of Deadly Force in the Arrest Process, 31 LA. L. REV. 131, 13233 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Arrest Process].
This note is concerned with a peace officer's use of deadly force to effect an arrest. A
discussion of other situations which might justify homicide by a peace officer (e.g. selfdefense or defense of another) is beyond the scope of this note.
6. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 39-40, 44 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
9. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
10. 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
11. Id. at 1697-1707.
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BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment and Seizures of the Person
The first clause of the fourth amendment 12 requires that all government conducted seizures 3 be reasonable.' 4 The terms "seizure"
and "reasonable" are not defined by the amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has held, however, that for fourth amendment purposes, a seizure of a person has occurred whenever a government official restrains that person's freedom to walk away.15
The reasonableness of a seizure of the person is determined by the
use of a balancing test which takes into account the nature and
intrusiveness of the seizure, as well as the importance of the government interests that allegedly justify the seizure.' 6
12. See supra note 1.
13. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the United States
Supreme Court had held that the Bill of Rights imposed limitations on the federal government only. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Today, the provisions of
the fourth amendment apply to state governments as well because the privacy interest
safeguarded by the amendment is encompassed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). Additionally, the fourteenth amendment requires that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures made in
violation of the fourth amendment be inadmissible in a state criminal trial. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Se_ infra note 17.
For a more complete discussion of fourteenth amendment incorporation of the fourth
amendment and other Bill of Rights guarantees, see generally F. GRAHAM, THE SELFINFLICTED WOUND (1970); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55-129

(1984); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567-69 (1978); Israel, Selective
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253 (1982).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The second clause of the fourth amendment explicitly
requires that all warrants be based upon probable cause. See supra note 1. Probable
cause to arrest exists "where 'facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been
or is being committed." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
The fourth amendment does not, however, require a peace officer to obtain a warrant
in order to effect an arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1975).
Rather, the fourth amendment requires that a warrantless arrest be based upon the same
probable cause standard as an arrest made with a warrant.
15. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (a roving Border Patrol stop of a vehicle near the Mexican border, in order to question occupants about
citizenship and immigration status, held to be a seizure). The Court has had some difficulty in establishing the point at which minimal police interference becomes sufficiently
restrictive to become a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. See, e.g., United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (whether conduct by Drug Enforcement Administration agents constituted a seizure debated by a divided court).
16. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), wherein the Court, balancing the state's interest in ensuring the
safety of its roadways against the physical and psychological intrusion imposed upon
occupants of a vehicle stopped at random, held that the state's interests were insufficient
to justify random stops to check for a driver's license or a vehicle registration. Id. at 654-
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The fourth amendment does not prescribe any means to enforce
its terms. However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment must
be excluded from trial in a criminal case. 7 Additionally, an individual seized in violation of the fourth amendment has a cause of
action grounded in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,18 or in a species of constitu61; see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (a motorist is less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by an intrusion at a traffic checkpoint removed from the border
than by a roving stop conducted by Border Patrol officers and this consideration is relevant to fourth amendment analysis); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) (an officer
may make an intrusion short of arrest without probable cause to arrest where he has
reasonable apprehension of danger). For a more complete discussion of the balancing of
interests employed in fourth amendment analysis, see generally Bacigal, The Fourth
Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fallof ProbableCause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 776-86.
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), held that due process requires that evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment be inadmissible in a state criminal trial.
For a detailed summary of the scope of the so-called "exclusionary rule," see W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 132-55, 713-78. The exclusionary rule has been the subject
of heated debate. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-27
(197 1) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the exclusionary rule and listing commentary
in accord). For a survey of pre-1974 legal commentary, see Comment, Trends in Legal
Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 373 (1974). For
more recent commentary, see Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Compensating Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633
(1983); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365
(1983); White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1273 (1983).
Recently, the scope of the exclusionary rule has been limited significantly by the
United States Supreme Court. After United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984),
no exclusion of evidence is required when officers act in good faith reliance on a warrant
which is subsequently determined to be invalid.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), dealt with the more specific question of whether
a confession obtained after an arrest made in violation of the fourth amendment must be
excluded. In Brown, the Court held that a confession obtained after an unconstitutional
arrest may be admissible, but that the prosecution must first establish the confession to be
voluntary. Id. at 600-03. The Court held that four factors are relevant in considering the
voluntariness of a confession obtained after an unconstitutional arrest: whether Miranda
warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966), were given; the temporal
proximity of the arrest and confession; the presence of intervening circumstances; and
the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04. See
generally Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Tainted Confessions:Admissibility As a
Policy Decision, 13 Hous. L. REV. 753 (1976); 25 EMORY L.J. 227 (1976) (discussing the
Brown decision).
An analysis similar to that required by the Brown decision would be necessary to determine whether identification evidence (fingerprints, photographs, face-to-face confrontations, etc.) obtained after an unconstitutional arrest must also be excluded. W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 752-53.

18.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
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tional tort liability created by the United States Supreme Court. 19
Finally, a willful violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights may subject the violator to criminal liability. °
Police Use of Deadly Force to Effect an Arrest
At common law, homicide by a peace officer was justified 2 1 and
privileged2 2 if the use of deadly force23 was necessary to effect the
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
The remedy afforded in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is supplementary to any state remedy, and a
state remedy need not be sought in order to seek relief under the statute. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For a more complete discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
potential remedy for police misconduct, see Penland & Boardman, Section 1983 - Contemporary Trends in the Police Misconduct Arena, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (1984).
A complete discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is beyond the scope of this note. Treatises
which cover Section 1983 in depth include C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS;
CIVIL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1980) and S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1979).

19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), allows for the recovery of money damages for injuries suffered as a result of a violation of the fourth
amendment by federal officials. Id. at 397. The constitutional tort liability created by the
Bivens decision in lieu of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is necessary in order for a plaintiff complaining
of a violation of civil rights to recover damages from the federal government, since 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is not applicable to federal officials.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) provides in part :
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject
to any imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court held that acting "willfully"
means acting with a purpose to deprive someone of a constitutional right. Id. at 107.
The Court also held that one who acts "under color of law" may be a state or federal
officer. Id. at 108.
21. Justification is a defense to criminal liability. Conduct normally prohibited and
punishable is justified when social policy requires suspension of criminal prosecution.
For a more complete discussion of the criminal law principle of justification, see generally
W. LAFAVE & A. SCorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972); Note, Justification:
The Impact of the Model PenalCode on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 91621 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Impact of the Model Penal Code]; Comment, Justification
Under the Proposed CriminalCode, 38 Mo. L. REV. 613, 613-14 (1971); Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the CriminalLaw, 13 STAN. L. REV. 566 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Justification in the Criminal Law]; Comment, Justification Under the Proposed
California Criminal Code, 19 UCLA L. REV. 586, 600 (1972).
22. Privilege is a defense to tort liability. Conduct normally tortious and actionable is
privileged when existing circumstances allow the avoidance of liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 10(1) (1965). A person's conduct is privileged when the person
acts to further an interest of such social importance that the conduct is entitled to protection, even at the expense of the plaintiff. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 108-10 (5th ed. 1984).
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arrest of a person suspected of any felony.2 4 Deadly force was not
sanctioned in the arrest of a fleeing misdemeanant, even when necessary to effect arrest.2 5 This "any felony" rule2 6 reflected the social and legal context of the common-law concept of felony.17 At
common law, virtually all felonies were punishable by death,
whereas misdemeanors, in general, were not. 28 Therefore, a felon
was thought to have forfeited his life by committing his crime, and
the use of deadly force in effecting a felon's arrest was seen as a
mere acceleration of the penal process.2 9 Nineteen states have
codified the "any felony" rule in justification statutes,3" and four
23. For purposes of this note, the term "deadly force" is used as it is defined in the
Model Penal Code, i.e., "force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which
he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
24. 2 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 85 (1788) provides, "If persons
that are pursued by the officers for felony or for just suspicion thereof. . . shall not yield
themselves to these officers, but instead shall either resist or fly before they are apprehended . . . are upon necessity slain therein, it is no felony." Id.

See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster,
218 Ala. 468, 477, 118 So. 794, 802 (1928); Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 411-12, 198
A.2d 700, 705-06 (1964); Collins v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 412, 416, 233 S.W. 896, 898
(1921); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 187, 136 S.E. 375, 376 (1927); Love v. Bass,
145 Tenn. 522, 529, 238 S.W. 94, 96 (1922); Reese v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 374,
379-80, 503 P.2d 64, 69-70 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973).
25. 2 M. HALE, supra note 24, at 117; see Evans v. Walker, 237 Ala. 385, 187 So. 189
(1939); Stevens v. Adams, 181 Ark. 816, 817, 27 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (1930); Moore v.
Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 19, 180 So. 73, 73 (1938); Padilla v. Chavez, 62 N.M. 170, 172, 306
P.2d 1094, 1095 (1957); State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, 39 Tenn. App. 190, 197, 282
S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (1943); see also Pearson, supra note 5, at 964; Note, supra note 5, at
154-55.
26. The common-law rule which made homicide by a peace officer justified and privileged when necessary to effect the arrest of a person suspected of any felony is referred to
hereinafter as the "any felony" rule.
27. At common law, a crime was classified as treason, felony or misdemeanor. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 568 (1924). Felony was the name
given to the worst, utterly "bootless" crimes. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 464-66 (2d ed. 1959). An explanation of the common-law felony
concept can be achieved only by enumeration of the common-law felonies. These felonies included murder, manslaughter, suicide (punishable by forfeiture of land and chattel,
as were other felonies), mayhem, rape, arson, burglary, and larceny. Id. at 485-500. For
a complete discussion of the common law's classification of crimes, see generally Wilgus,
supra, at 568-77. See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438-41 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the common-law distinction between felony and
misdemeanor).
28. The common-law concept of felony was profoundly linked with capital punishment. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98. All felonies except petit larceny
were punishable by death. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 466 n.3.
Misdemeanors, with the exception of piracy, were not punishable by death. Id.
29. See Arrest Process, supra note 5, at 133; Justification in the CriminalLaw, supra
note 21, at 582.
30. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-510(2)(a) (1977); CONN.
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others have retained it by court decision. 3 '
The first significant attempt to modify the "any felony" rule was
made by the American Law Institute (the "A.L.I.") when it
adopted the Restatement of Torts in 1934. The original Restatement suggested that a peace officer's privilege32 to use deadly force
to arrest was limited to situations involving only certain, rather
than all, felony suspects.3 3 However, after several decisions held
contrary to the Restatement,34 the A.L.I. in 1948 adopted a replacement section which more closely resembled the "any felony"
rule.35 In 1965, the A.L.I. retained the replacement section in the
§ 53a-22(c) (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-4009(4) (1979); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-3(b)(2) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215
(1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1)(d) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.046.3.
(Vernon 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140.3 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 732 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.239 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-7-9 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-16-32, 22-16-33 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) (limited to felons in Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114
S.W. 819 (1938), see infra note 54); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.040 (3) (1977);
WiS. STAT. § 939.45(4) (1981-1982) (officer may use force necessary for a "reasonable
accomplishment of a lawful arrest," but see Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544, 546
(E.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1975)); WYO. STAT. § 61-102(b) (1983) (retaining common law defenses).
31. Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 753, 318 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1982)
(upholding judgment of no cause of action where defendant peace officer had used deadly
force against fleeing plaintiff, after the officer observed plaintiff unlawfully enter a parked
automobile and remove a radio); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 62-65, 396 N.E.2d
246, 257-58 (C.P. Franklin County 1979) (listing cases which, taken together, give a general statement of the law); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 1109, 178 S.E. 8,
11 (1935) (use of deadly force must be necessary to effect felon's arrest); Thompson v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 116 W. Va. 705, 711, 182 S.E. 880, 883-84 (1935) (vacating judgment
for plaintiff moonshiner, a felon, shot by defendant's employee while fleeing to avoid
arrest).
32. See supra note 22.
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131 (1934) provides:
The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the
other by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if
(a) the arrest is made for treason or for a felony which normally causes or
threatens death or serious bodily harm, or which involves the breaking
and entry of a dwelling place, and
(b) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected.
34. See Stinnet v. Virginia, 55 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1932); Ex parte Warner, 21 F.2d
542 (N.D. Okla. 1927); Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 259 Ky. 789, 83 S.W.2d 521
(1935); Thompson v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 116 W. Va. 705, 182 S.E. 880 (1935).
35. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131 (1948) provides:
The actor's use of force against another, for the purpose of effecting a privileged arrest of the other, by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if
(a) the arrest is made under a warrant which charges the person named
therein with the commission of treason or a felony, or if the arrest is
made without a warrant for treason or for a felony which has been committed, and
GEN. STAT.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts.36

37
The A.L.I. has had more success with its Model Penal Code,
which justifies the use of deadly force to arrest only in situations
where the immediate apprehension of the fleeing suspect is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to others.38 Eight
states follow the Model Penal Code approach or more stringent

(b) the other is the person named in the warrant if the arrest is under a warrant, or the actor reasonably believes the offense was committed by the
other if the arrest is made without a warrant, and
(c) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot be otherwise effected.
The reporter's notes explain "that § 131 as originally worded stated a desirable rule of
law but that the change is necessary in a Restatement of existing authorities. . . .Every
case which actually decides the question agrees that the. . . common law is still the law
... " Id. at 634.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 (1965).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides in pertinent part:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and...
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved the use or threatened
use of deadly force; or
(2) there is substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death
or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed.
The A.L.I. refrained from enumerating felonies which necessarily involve the use or
threatened use of deadly force, see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text, because of a
fear that the list would be insufficiently comprehensive. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07
comment 3, at 59 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). Additionally, the A.L.I. desired that the
particular conduct of an offender be considered, rather than the general category of crime
into which the the conduct falls. Id. at 60.
For a complete discussion of the Model Penal Code approach as an alternative to the
"any felony" rule, see generally Day, supra note 5, at 302-04; Impact of the Model Penal
Code, supra note 21, at 947-53.
38. The Model Penal Code approach proceeds upon the principle that the only situation where the need for immediate apprehension of a suspect outweighs the suspect's
interest in his own life is where apprehension is necessary to prevent death or great bodily
harm to someone other than the suspect. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 comment 3, at 5859 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The Code approach disdains any theory that the use of
deadly force can be justified as a deterrent to crime. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d
1007, 1015 (8th Cir. 1976), in which the court quoted a statement made by Judge
Learned Hand at the 1958 A.L.I. proceedings: "'It has been constantly supposed here
that if you are able to shoot a robber you are less likely to have a robber. I question that.
I challenge it altogether. I don't believe that possibility figures at all in the commission of
crime .
'"
The Model Penal Code approach, though widely praised by commentators, see Day,
supra note 5, at 303 n.99, has been criticized as encouraging flight by criminals. See
Shuman v. McGinn, 307 Minn. 446, 466, 240 N.W.2d 525, 536-37 (1976), in which the
court quoted Professor John Barker Waite, "'[W]e say to the criminal... [t]he officer
dare not take the risk of shooting at you. If you can outrun him, outrun him . . . . If
you are faster than he is, you are free, and God bless you.'"
The Model Penal Code approach has also been criticized as requiring peace officers to
make difficult predictions of future conduct. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1023 (8th
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standards.39

Six states have adopted rules which enumerate a type of violent,
dangerous, or "forcible" felony.' ° These "forcible felony" statutes
justify homicide by a peace officer if the use of deadly force is necessary to effect the arrest of one suspected of an enumerated felony.4 ' "Forcible felony" statutes attempt to limit the use of deadly
force to the arrest of dangerous felons,42 but some statutes are
anomalous, enumerating felonies which are not necessarily forceful
or dangerous.43
Cir. 1976) (Gibson, J., dissenting). "How can a police officer ever know, reasonably or
otherwise, whether the felon will use force against others if not apprehended?" Id.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467 (1979) (felony involving physical force and a
substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or serious bodily injury or will never be
recaptured); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 703-307 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8 (1979);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.090 (Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (suspect committed felony involving use or threat of physical force and is likely to endanger life unless apprehended without delay); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412 (1979).
California probably belongs in this category. In Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d
325, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1977), the court held that a peace officer may use deadly force to
arrest a suspect only if the crime for which the suspect is sought was a "forcible and
atrocious one which threatens death or serious bodily harm," or if there is substantial risk
that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed. Id. at 333, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 30-3 1; see also People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.
3d 470, 476-84, 116 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237-42, 526 P.2d 241, 243-49 (1974); Long Beach
Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-74, 132 Cal. Rptr.
348, 353-54 (1976).
Massachusetts probably extends the limitations of the Model Penal Code approach to
its peace officers. Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980).
New York adopted the Model Penal Code approach in 1965, but discarded it in 1967 in
order to allow the use of deadly force against a wider range of suspected criminals. See
generally Leibovitz, Justifiable Use of Force Under Article 35 of the Penal Law of New
York, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 285 (1969). Idaho adopted the Model Penal Code as a whole
in 1971, but repealed it three months after its effective date. See generally Stone & Hall,
The Model Penal Code in Idaho?, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 221 (1972).
Vermont forbids the use of deadly force except when needed to prevent certain violent
felonies. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2805(2) (Supp. 1985).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, $ 2-8, 7-5 (Supp.
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-3-7 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney
Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508 (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2404(2) (1986).
41. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 2-8 (Supp. 1984), which provides in part,
'Forcible felony' . . . means treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated
criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnaping, aggravated battery, and any other felony which involves the use or threatened use of physical force against any individual."
42. "To authorize the killing of an offender who is not likely to harm anyone if he
successfully resists arrest simply on the ground that his offense is designated as a felony
instead of a misdemeanor, seems indefensible." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 7-5 Comm.
Comments - 1961 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
43. See supra note 41. In Illinois, spitting on a police officer would constitute the
forcible felony of aggravated battery, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
12-4(b)(6) (1983);
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Ten other states, using varying language, allow the use of deadly
force to effect arrest only if the suspect has committed a violent
felony, is escaping with a deadly weapon, or is likely to endanger
life or inflict serious physical injury if not immediately apprehended." The three remaining states either have no relevant statute or case law, or have positions that are unclear.4"
Many police departments have established guidelines regarding
the use of deadly force.46 While these policies vary, most departmental guidelines do not authorize the use of deadly force to arrest
every felon. 7 Many police department policies are more restrictive
than state law requires them to be.4" Department policies are important in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Monell v. Department of Social Services,4 9 which held that a
municipality may be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.50
burning a stamp collection to defraud an insurer would constitute the forcible felony of
arson, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 20-1(b) (1983); and breaking into an automobile to
steal a package of cigarettes would constitute the forcible felony of burglary, see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38,
19-1 (1983). See Comment, Policeman's Use of Deadly Force in
Illinois, 48 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 252, 252-54 (1971).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(a) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-410A
(1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707(2)b (1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2)
(West 1974), construed in Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124, 132 (E.D. La. 1969); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 107.2.B (1985); MINN. STAT. § 609.066 (1980); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 627:5(11) (Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-401 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-07.2.d (1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(c) (Vernon 1974) (Butsee

Wolfer v. Thaler, 525 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976),
where the Court held the killing of a fleeing burglary suspect to be justifiable under Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.41(c), which allows for the protection of property).
45. These are Maryland, Montana, and South Carolina. A Maryland court has indicated, however, that deadly force may not be used against a fleeing felon who poses no
immediate danger to anyone. See Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 589,
444 A.2d 483, 486 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982). In Montana, a peace officer will be criminally
liable for an unnecessary assault of a suspect. See State v. Prlja, 57 Mont. 461, 465, 189
P. 64, 66 (1920). In South Carolina, an officer who uses deadly force to arrest a misdemeanant is guilty of manslaughter. State v. Sudduth, 74 S.C. 498, 502, 54 S.E. 1013, 1014
(1906).
46. For a limited survey of police department policies, see generally W. GELLER &
K.

KARALES, SPLIT-SECOND DECISIONS:

SHOOTINGS OF AND BY CHICAGO POLICE

33-

42 (1981); Triggering ConstitutionalReview, supra note 5, at 370 nn.42-43.
47. See W. GELLER & K. KARALES, supra note 46, at 33-42.
48. Id.
49. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50. Id. at 690. For the pertinent part of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note 18. Prior to
Monell, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), had held that a municipal corporation was
not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell overruled Monroe insofar as
Monroe made a municipality wholly immune from suit under the section. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690.
The Monell and Monroe Courts based their holdings on differing interpretations of the
intent of the Forty-Second Congress, which had enacted Section 1983's forerunner, Ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (more popularly known as the K.K.K. Act or the Civil Rights Act
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After Monell, a police department may be liable under the statute
if an execution of department policy causes a deprivation of federal
rights.' Prior to Monell, a department could authorize its peace
officers to use any amount of force justified by state law without
risking liability in federal court."2
DISCUSSION

On October 3, 1974, Officer Elton Hymon of the Memphis, Tennessee Police Department shot and killed Edward Garner as Garner, unarmed, attempted to flee the scene of a nighttime residential
burglary. 3 Hymon was not prosecuted because his actions were
of 1871). See generally Comment, A Survey of Organizationaland Supervisory Liability
Under 42 U.S.C Section 1983 and Section 1985(3), 46 Mo. L. REV. 371, 372 n.1 (1981)
(discussing the history of the statute); Comment, The Supreme Court Rewrites a Law :
MunicipalLiability Under Section 1983, 15 URB. LAW. 503 (1983) (discussing the different approaches of the Monroe and Monell Courts).
Monell left open the question of whether or not a municipality could plead the good
faith of its officers, see infra note 59, as a defense to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. However,
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), settled the question by holding that a
municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to liability under the
section. Id. at 638.
For a more complete discussion of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see generally Comment, Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Torts
after Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. REV. 514 (1979); Note, Civil Rights
Suits Against State and Local Government Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 956-62, 1006-60, 1120-28 (1980).
51. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. After Monell, a municipality is to be treated as any
other person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with an important exception. A municipality may not be sued under the section solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Only
when it is the execution of city policy that causes the injury may a municipality be liable
under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Id.
52. Prior to Monell, there was no jurisdictional basis for challenging the constitutionality of a city's policy in federal court. Money damages were unavailable from local
governments because of the eleventh amendment. See generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY (1972);

Baker, Federalism and the

Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977); Jaffe, Suits Against Government
and Officers. Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). Money damages were
unavailable from an officer because of the qualified immunity defense of good faith reliance on existing law. See infra note 59. Furthermore, a plaintiff was without standing to
request equitable relief because he could not allege the future harm necessary to invoke
federal equity jurisdiction, if defendant had already killed plaintiffs decedent. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 173 (1977), wherein the Court held that emotional
involvement in a lawsuit is not enough to meet the case-or-controversy requirement.
53. According to Officer Hymon's testimony at trial, he believed the suspect to be
seventeen or eighteen years old and 5'5" or 5'7". In fact, Garner was a 5'4" fifteen-yearold. In addition, Officer Hymon saw no weapon, and was "reasonably sure" that the
suspect was unarmed. However, Officer Hymon was sure that "there was no way" he
could have caught Garner if the suspect climbed over a six-foot high cyclone fence.
Although Officer Hymon called out "police, halt!," Garner attempted to scale the fence.
Officer Hymon then shot the suspect. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1697 (1985).
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clearly justified by Tennessee law in that Garner was a suspected
felon." Garner's father brought an action in the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The complaint alleged that the shooting
violated Garner's fourth amendment rights, 5 6 and named as defendants Hymon, the Memphis Police Department and its director,
and the City of Memphis and its mayor.57
Following a bench trial, judgment was entered for all of the defendants. The claims against the mayor and the director were dismissed for lack of evidence.5 8 The trial judge concluded that
Hymon's actions were justified by Tennessee law and that Hymon
was therefore entitled to the defense of good faith reliance on existing law.5 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed with regard
to Hymon, 6° but remanded 61 for consideration of the possible liability of the city and police department in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Monell v. Departmentof Social
Services.62 On remand, the district court determined that Monell
54. Id. at 1698. Tennessee subscribes to the "any felony" rule. See supra notes 21-31
and accompanying text. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) provides, "If, after notice
of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use
all the necessary force to effect the arrest."
While the statute implies otherwise, deadly force to arrest a misdemeanant is not justified in Tennessee. Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 137, 114 S.W. 819, 820-21 (1938).
55. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 1-4, 12-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth
amendment.
The complaint also alleged violations of the fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this note.
57. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1698 (1985).
58. Id.
59. Id. Law enforcement officials may avoid liability for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by interposing the qualified immunity defense of good faith reliance on existing
law. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). An official is immune from liability for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the legal standard controlling his conduct was not
clearly established at the time of his action, or if the standard was unknown to him and
could not reasonably be expected to have been known by him. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
A municipality employing a peace officer may not, however, assert the good faith of the
officer as a defense to liability for the constitutional torts committed by him. Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). For a discussion of municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
For a more complete discussion of the good faith immunity defense, see generally Penland & Boardman, supra note 18, at 684-92; Note, supra note 50, at 1045-48.
60. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52, 54 (6th Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 54-55.
62. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). For a discussion of Monell and municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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did not affect its earlier decision. 63 The court of appeals, however,
found that the shooting of Garner was a violation of the fourth
61 and remanded for reconsideration of the city's
amendment,
liabil65
ity. The State of Tennessee, intervening to save its statute, appealed to the United States Supreme Court,66 and the City of
Memphis filed a petition for certiorari. After noting probable jurisdiction in the appeal and granting the petition,67 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision in Tennessee
v. Garner.68
Tennessee v. Garner
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that a peace officer's ability to use deadly force to effect an arrest is limited by the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 69 Noting that lesser
intrusions have been determined to be seizures," the Court concluded that apprehension of a suspect by the use
of a firearm is a
seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. 7 '
63. See Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1698 (1985).
64. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 243-48 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub
nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). The court of appeals held that the
Tennessee statute conflicted with the fourth amendment because it did not adequately
distinguish between felonies of differing magnitudes or limit the use of deadly force to
situations involving dangerous felons. Id. at 246. The Sixth Circuit held that the rule set
forth in the Model Penal Code, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, accurately
reflected fourth amendment limitations on the use of deadly force to effect an arrest. 710
F.2d at 247. Furthermore, the court held that the fourteenth amendment required the
same result, because the Tennessee statute was not narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest. Id. at 246-47.
For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit opinion, see Comment, The Unconstitutional Use
of Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Fleeing Felons: Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 18 GA. L. REv. 137, 153-62 (1983); 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155 (1983).
65. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1983).
66. Such intervention is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (1982).
67. Tennessee v. Garner, 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984).
68. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, and was
joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.
69. Id. at 1699. Prior to the Garner litigation, there had been only one recorded
appellate decision discussing the fourth amendment as a limitation on the use of deadly
force to effect an arrest. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1970) (appellee
peace officer, negligent in shooting appellant, violated appellant's fourth amendment
right "to be free from unreasonable interference by police officers"). However, Chief
Justice Burger, in fourth amendment analysis, had predicted judicial hostility to the use
of deadly force against car thieves, pickpockets, or shoplifters. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Triggering
ConstitutionalReview, supra note 5, at 384-85 (suggesting police use of deadly force is
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment).
70. 105 S. Ct. at 1699. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for the Supreme
Court's definition of a seizure for fourth amendment purposes.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
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A majority of the Court then determined that the seizure of Garner was unreasonable. The Court applied a balancing test 72 by

weighing the interests of the suspect against the state's interests in
apprehending him. The Court determined that the state's interest
in apprehending a nonviolent felony suspect cannot be sufficient to
outweigh the suspect's interest in his life.73 The Court established
two conditions which must be satisfied before a police officer may
use deadly force to effect an arrest: first, the deadly force must be
necessary to the arrest and second, the officer must have probable
cause to believe that the person to be arrested poses a significant
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others.74
Citing changes in "legal and technological context,"75 the Court
refused to look to the common law in evaluating the reasonableness of the Garner seizure. 76 Instead, the Court examined the justification statutes and case law in other jurisdictions, 77 and
determined that there had been a long-term movement away from
the "any felony" rule. 78 The majority was most persuaded, however, by the tendency of police departments to adopt policies more
restrictive than the "any felony" rule.79
Finally, the majority held that, for fourth amendment purposes,
72. Id. at 1700-01. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
balancing of interests required in fourth amendment analysis.
73. 105 S.Ct. at 1700.
74. Id. at 1697. The Court in dicta provided some guidelines for establishing probable cause to believe the suspect will cause death or serious bodily injury to the officer or
others. Following the approach of the Model Penal Code, see supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text, the Court stated that where there is probable cause to believe the
suspect "has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where
feasible, some warning has been given." 105 S.Ct. at 1701.
75. 105 S.Ct. at 1703. The majority noted that no longer are most felonies punishable by death, see supra note 28, that the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
today is often minor and arbitrary, that felons are not necessarily more dangerous than
misdemeanants, and that the common-law "any felony" rule preceded the widespread use
of firearms by peace officers, which now necessarily gives the rule a different meaning and
attaches to it harsher consequences. 105 S.Ct. at 1703.
76. 105 S.Ct. at 1701-06. When evaluating the reasonableness of a police procedure
for fourth amendment purposes, the Court has often looked to the common law. See,
e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 111, 114 (1975); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-53 (1925). But see
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980) (police practices in effect at the time
of the passage of the fourth amendment not necessarily constitutional today).
77. 105 S.Ct. at 1704. See supra notes 30-31, 39-40, 44-45 and accompanying text
for a limited survey of state justification law regarding the use of deadly force to effect an
arrest.
78. 105 S.Ct. at 1705.
79. Id. at 1705-06. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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a burglar is not inherently dangerous.80 The Court concluded,
therefore, that Garner did not pose a sufficient threat to the safety
of Officer Hymon or others to justify the shooting."'
Having concluded that the shooting of Garner was a violation
of the fourth amendment, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded for a determination of the liability
of the city and the police department.8 2
Dissent
The dissent83 disagreed that the shooting of Edward Garner by
Officer Hymon was a violation of the fourth amendment.8 4 The
dissent accused the majority of obscuring the issue, which should
have been whether Garner's rights were violated, not whether the
Tennessee statute was constitutional.85 The dissent agreed that the
use of deadly force is a "seizure" subject to the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth amendment.8 6 However the dissent, unlike the majority, concluded that a balancing test can support the
use of deadly force against a residential burglar.8 7 The dissent argued that residential burglary is a dangerous crime, 8 and that the
use of deadly force to effect an arrest is a police practice which
serves the state's interest in protecting the public from the burglar
at large while also accommodating the interests of the suspect.8 9
ANALYSIS

In Tennessee v. Garner,90 the majority incorrectly focused on the
80. 105 S. Ct. at 1706-07. This determination was necessitated by the adoption of a
rule which puts in issue the dangerousness of the fleeing suspect. The majority relied
upon the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation classifies burglary as a "property
crime" rather than as a "crime against person." Id. at 1706. The majority also cited the
fact that only 3.8% of all burglaries between the years 1973-82 involved violence. Id. at
1707. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
81. 105 S.Ct. at 1706.
82. Id. at 1707.
83. Justice O'Connor authored the dissent, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 1707-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent also
noted that the original complaint cited violations of the fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 1711. However, the dissent concluded that the shooting of Garner
violated none of these constitutional provisions. Id.
85. Id. at 1708.
86. Id. at 1709.
87. Id. at 1709-11.
88. Id. at 1709.
89. Id. at 1711. "To avoid the use of deadly force and the consequent risk to his life,
the suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt." Id.
90. 105 S. Ct. at 1694.
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constitutionality of the Tennessee statute rather than on the constitutionality of a given use of deadly force by a peace officer.9" The
majority's analysis in Garnershould have been limited to the question of whether Garner's fourth amendment rights had been violated. Properly focused, the majority would have more carefully
considered the state's interest in immediately apprehending a
nighttime residential burglar and would have considered the prevailing trend away from the "any felony" rule only in its proper
context.92
A fourth amendment balancing approach weighs the interests of
the state against the interests of the individual. 93 The majority
achieved the proper balance by establishing a rule that deadly
force may not be used to arrest nonviolent suspects. 94 The majority's rule is unobjectionable, and might have been embraced by a
unanimous Court in litigation involving a lesser felon. 95 However
the majority, by failing to make a distinction between residential
and nonresidential burglary, and by refusing to adopt a presumption that a nighttime residential burglar is dangerous, applied its
rule incorrectly, and achieved a result more restrictive than that
required by the fourth amendment.
The majority dismissed burglary as a crime which "rarely in91. Id. at 1702-06. The existence (or nonexistence) of a state rule of criminal procedure purporting to authorize the taking of a life is not relevant to consideration of
whether or not the taking of that life violates the federal constitution. The existence of
the Tennessee statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982), see supra note 54, was relevant only to consideration of the immunity, see supra note 59, of the actor asserting the
statute as a defense. The actor in the Garner litigation, Officer Hymon, had been dismissed from the suit, and was no longer a party. All that is relevant for purposes of the
fourth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the balancing of the interests of the state and
of the individual. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Thus, the majority's assertion that TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982) was unconstitutional as applied, 105 S.
Ct. at 1701, is of little value.
92. While a survey of the state of the law and police procedure is certainly helpful in
an intuitive analysis of what is reasonable, a perceived trend should not be constitutionally controlling. Cf Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S.Ct. 3154 (1984). "The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of
its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." Id. at 3165.
93. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
94. The majority grounded its rule in the persuasive principle that the need for immediate apprehension of a suspect can outweigh the suspect's interest in his life only when
immediate apprehension of the suspect is necessary to prevent serious harm to another.
105 S.Ct. at 1701. This principle was embraced by the A.L.I. in adopting the Model
Penal Code. See supra note 38.
95. Chief Justice Burger had already shown his hostility to the idea of the shooting of
a car thief, a pickpocket, or a shoplifter in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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volve[s] physical violence,"' 96 despite the Court's awareness that 2.8
million violent burglaries were committed between 1973 and
1982. 9 7 The majority was apparently persuaded by the fact that
this number comprises only 3.8% of all burglaries reported in that
period. 98 However, this percentage is misleading and is not helpful
in considering the dangerousness of the nighttime, residential burglar. Consideration of the percentage of nighttime residential burglaries which involve violence would have been more appropriate.
Such a percentage, if available, would have placed the home burglar's potential for violence in a more proper perspective.
The majority also found persuasive the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in its Uniform Crime Reports, classifies burglary as a "crime against property," rather than as a "crime
against person." 99 This too is a misleading fact. The Federal Bureau of Investigation classifies most burglaries involving physical
force against an individual as either "criminal homicide," "forcible
rape," "robbery," or "aggravated assault"; all of these crimes are
"crimes against persons."" ° Thus, for purposes of the Uniform
Crime Reports, an incident classified as a burglary almost never can
include violence, because the incident would then be classified as a
more serious crime.' 01
A presumption that a nighttime home burglar is dangerous is
justified by the potential for violence that exists in every residential
burglary. 102 The need for such a presumption becomes even more
apparent when one considers the on-the-spot evaluations required
of peace officers investigating a burglary in progress or pursuing a
suspected burglar. 103 Had the Garnermajority adopted such a pre96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

105 S. Ct. at 1706-07.
Id. at 1707 n.23.
Id. at 1707.
Id. at 1706.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK (1980).
101. Id. at 33.
102. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 316 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (harsh
potentialities for violence are inherent in the forced entry of a home); see also BUREAU OF
JUST. STATISTICS BULL., HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (Jan. 1985), cited in Tennessee v.
Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1709 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), noting that three-fifths of
rapes and robberies perpetrated in the home between the years 1973-1982 were committed by burglars, and that there were 2.8 million such violent burglaries during that ten
year span.
103. Neither Officer Hymon, nor any other peace officer, could have known whether
Edward Garner had committed an aggravating violent crime while inside the dwelling
from which he fled. Nor could anyone have predicted whether Garner would use force in
the future. All any peace officer could have concluded about Garner is that the suspect
had just committed a nighttime residential burglary. Presuming the residence to be occu-
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sumption, it would have achieved the correct result: the shooting
of a nighttime residential burglar, when necessary to effect his
arrest, is not an unreasonable seizure of the person for purposes of
the fourth amendment.
IMPACT

Tennessee v. Garner is an important case because it forces police
departments to reexamine their policies regarding the use of force
in order to avoid liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' 4 After Garner,
police departments have little choice but to adopt a policy similar
to the Model Penal Code approach' °5 which, as a practical matter,
has been constitutionally endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court. I 6 Police departments that want to adhere as much as possible to a "forcible felony" approach' 017 may still enumerate felonies. However, such departments should note the Supreme Court's
refusal to presume that a nighttime home burglar is dangerous, 08
and should enumerate only felonies which necessarily involve the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. 1 9 Such
a hybrid of the Model Penal Code and "forcible felony" approaches
pied, given the hour, and considering the potential for violence involved in household
burglaries, see supra note 102, a presumption that the suspect who refuses to stop after
being ordered to do so has committed a violent crime is not unreasonable. See Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1023 (8th Cir. 1976) (Gibson, J., dissenting), "How can a police
officer ever know, reasonably or otherwise, whether the felon will use force against others
if not immediately apprehended?" Id.
104. Following Monell v. Department of Social Services, see supra notes 50-51, a
police department would be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a given use of
deadly force which violated the fourth amendment, but only if the officer involved was
following department policy. Therefore, a police department adopting a policy which
literally embodies the Garner holding would be safe from liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, even if its employee violates the rule established in Garner.
105. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
106. The Garner majority, unlike the Sixth Circuit, did not explicitly hold that the
fourth amendment limitations on the use of deadly force to effect arrest are accurately
reflected in the provisions of the Model Penal Code. See Garner v. Memphis Police
Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 247 (1983). However, the Garnerrule that deadly force may be used
to arrest only if necessary to effect the arrest and only if there is probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury is,
as a practical matter, identical to the Model Penal Code approach. See supra note 37.
This conclusion is supported by Court dicta stating that the use of deadly force against a
person would not be unconstitutional if an officer had probable cause to believe that the
person had committed a crime involving the infliction of serious physical harm, and if the
use of deadly force was necessary to effect the arrest. 105 S. Ct. at 1701. See supra note
74.
107. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
108. 105 S. Ct. at 1706-07.
109. For example, a police department in Illinois could amend its policy accordingly:
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would accurately reflect fourth amendment limitations on the use
of deadly force after Garner.
Garneris also important because of its inevitable effect on state
justification statutes. Garner forces state legislatures to adopt the
provisions of the Model Penal Code,I"° or a hybrid based in part
thereon,"' in order to avoid the prospect of federal intervention
in the prosecution of peace officers who shoot nondangerous
felons. 'I2
Finally, Garneris important because it expands the scope of the
fourth amendment. In Garner, the United States Supreme Court
held for the first time that an arrest may be unconstitutional because of the amount of force used to effect it. After Garner, any
person subjected to a forcible arrest may complain that the force
used in his arrest violated the fourth amendment because the
state's interest in apprehending him or in preventing his escape was
constitutionally insufficient. Garner, taken to its logical extreme,
makes every person arrested by the use of handcuffs a potential 42
U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff," 3 and subjects to potential suppression evidence obtained after any forcible arrest. 114
CONCLUSION

Tennessee v. Garner held that the fourth amendment limits a
peace officer's ability to use deadly force to effect an arrest. Garner
A department member is authorized to use force likely to cause death or
great bodily injury in effecting arrest when:
(1) such force is necessary to effect the arrest, and
(2) the member has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
(a) has committed or attempted any of the following offenses as defined
in the Illinois Criminal Code:
(i) murder,
(ii) voluntary manslaughter,
(iii) robbery,
(iv) armed robbery, or
(b) has committed any other offense involving the use or threatened use
of force against a person, or
(c) will endanger human life or inflict serious physical harm unless arrested without delay.
A department in Illinois is limited in the number of felonies that it may safely enumerate because of the broad manner by which offenses normally thought to be forceful or
dangerous are defined. For example, in Illinois, a person could commit aggravated battery or arson without causing serious physical harm or endangering human life. See
supra note 43.
110. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 109.
112. Such use of deadly force would violate 18 U.S.C. § 242. See supra note 20.
113. See supra note 18.
114. See supra note 17.
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requires that before an officer may use deadly force, he must have
probable cause to believe that the suspect to be arrested poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others; additionally, deadly force must be necessary to effect the
arrest.
While the rule adopted by the court is unobjectionable, the
Court applied the rule incorrectly. A proper application of the rule
would have included a presumption that a nighttime residential
burglar is dangerous.
After Garner, police departments must adopt policies limiting
the use of deadly force or face potential liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. States also need to redraft their justification statutes in order to preclude intervention of the federal government in the prosecution of peace officers who violate the Garner holding. As a
practical matter, Garner forces states and police departments to
adopt a rule similar to that prescribed by the Model Penal Code.
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